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Abstract
We study the optimal management of a collectivised pension fund,
where all investors agree that the assets of deceased members are shared
among the survivors. We find that for realistic parameters based on the
UK pensions market, a collectivised fund achieves an approximately 20%
better return than either an annuity or a personal investment fund.
We introduce models of investor preferences over a stream of pension
payments in the presence of mortality, incorporating a new concept of
adequacy. We find that for risk-averse individuals, pension adequacy plays
an important role in determining the optimal fund management strategy.
A key issue in the design of collective funds is how to ensure the fund
treats all investors fairly. This is a trivial problem in the case that all
investors have identical preferences, wealth and mortality, but becomes
challenging for heterogeneous funds. We give a strategy for the manage-
ment of heterogeneous funds in complete markets and prove that it is
asymptotically optimal in the absence of systematic longevity risk.
Introduction
We study the problem of maximizing the benefit one can obtain from one’s
pension if one is willing to pursue a collective strategy. This is a strategy in
which a group of individuals agree that all assets left by an individual who dies
are shared among the survivors.
In the UK there is considerable interest in developing innovative pension
products as a result of legislative changes made in the Pension Schemes Act
2015 which allow much greater flexibility in how pensions can be invested. His-
torically, pension funds in the UK have been either defined-benefit (DB) funds
or defined-contribution (DC) funds. In a DB fund an employer promises to
pay their employees and their partners a pre-specified income from retirement
until death. Often these benefits would be index linked, i.e. they would pro-
vide a constant real-terms income. In a DC fund an employee has a personal
fund of pension investments. Historically the assets in a DC fund were used
to purchase an annuity at retirement, i.e. a financial product that would pay
a pre-specified income to the retiree and their partner until death (typically a
constant real-terms income).
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As a result of the 2015 pension reform, it is now possible to receive the
tax benefits afforded to pension investment without being restricted to such a
narrow range of investments. In particular, one need not invest the bulk of a DC
fund in an annuity. Nor are employer schemes restricted to DC and DB funds.
The legislation introduces a new framework of “defined ambition” schemes.
One form of defined ambition scheme is a collective defined contribution
(CDC) fund (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019). Such schemes are still
very new and the precise manner in which CDC funds are managed varies from
scheme to scheme. Broadly speaking a CDC fund is one which is managed for
the benefit of a group of individuals and endeavours to obtain a good pension
for all its members, but which does not promise a precisely defined pension.
One such fund is the planned new pension scheme for Royal Mail, modelled on
international innovations such as the New Brunswick Hospitals’ plan (Wilkinson,
2018).
Intuitively it is clear that a CDC fund should outperform a DB fund. This
is because of the following considerations.
(a) For large funds, ignoring systematic longevity risk, one can assume that an
employers DB liabilities depend only on interest rates. Assuming a typical
risk-neutral model for interest rate products, this means that a fully-funded
DB scheme will not use equity investments, and so cannot benefit from the
equity risk-premium.
(b) A constant real-terms income does not benefit from the possibility of in-
tertemporal substitution. This is the observation that if one is willing to
delay consumption in favour of investing for longer, one may be able to
obtain a higher rate of consumption in the future leading to a preferable
outcome.
(c) Due to changes in the level of the state pension, the optimal deterministic
real-terms income will change over time.
We will also argue that there is an additional, less obvious reason why constant
consumption is suboptimal.
(d) A constant real-terms income ignores the risk of dying young and not en-
joying any consumption. It also ignores the risk of living on an inadequate
pension for many years.
A CDC fund should also outperform individual DC fund, as collectivisation
should reduce idiosyncratic longevity risk.
However, it is not clear how significant these various effects are in practice,
nor is it clear how to optimally exploit these effects. This paper, therefore,
investigates how to manage a CDC fund and how to quantify the benefit of
such a fund. We do not attempt to answer these questions in full. Instead we
focus our attention on the novel aspect of collectivisation.
For this reason we will consider only the draw-down phase of pension invest-
ment, i.e. we study the optimal pattern of investment and consumption after
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retirement. We will compare three possible retirement products: an annuity
that provides a guaranteed fixed real-terms income; an individual fund where
consumption varies over time due to preferences and investment returns; a col-
lective fund for n individuals who agree to give any remaining assets to the fund
on death. An individual fund is the special case of a collective fund where n = 1.
As we have commented, many pension products also provide an income to one’s
partner, so the case of a couple investing together (n = 2) is also of particular
interest.
A second simplification we make is to assume that the only stochastic risk
factors are equity investments and idiosyncratic mortality risk. It would, of
course, be very interesting to consider many other risk-factors such as interest-
rate risk and systematic longevity risk. However, considering these additional
factors would distract attention from the central theme of collectivisation and
complicate the analysis.
A third simplification we make is to ignore bequests. It would not be difficult
to extend our results to include a bequest once all individuals in the collective
have died.
Based on these assumptions, we build a model for how to optimally invest
pensions for different sizes of collective and we show how to compute the optimal,
or near optimal, strategies. We model the market, preferences and the concept
of optimality. We compute a specific numerical example in the Section 6 based
on realistic market assumptions and find that one would need an approximately
20% larger fund to derive the same benefit from an annuity or individual fund
as one can derive from a collective fund with n & 100 individuals.
This has the immediate implication that one should not invest one’s pension
from a DC fund in an annuity, but should instead invest in a collectivised fund at
retirement. It follows that a CDC fund (managed optimally) will outperform a
DB fund from the point of view of the pensioner. To see this note that if one had
a DB fund giving a guaranteed income, a collective could sell this guaranteed
income stream and then use the proceeds to pursue the optimal investment
strategy of this paper.
Although we are focussing on the pensioner’s viewpoint, CDC funds are also
very attractive to the employer because they remove the liabilities inherent in
a DB scheme from the employers balance sheet. Stricter rules by the Pension
Regulator have lead to DB funds being invested in bonds rather than equities
which has, in turn, made DB funds unaffordable.
Having described the main implications of our model, we will now describe
the key steps in constructing the model.
Section 1 is a discussion of an individual’s preferences in the presence of mor-
tality over random consumption streams (describing the payments they receive
at each time, which it is assumed they immediately consume).
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature on preferences over ran-
dom consumption streams, there is less theoretical work on how this changes
if one incorporates mortality. Preferences with mortality have attracted atten-
tion in the context of the new field of household finance (whose emergence is
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presented in Guiso and Sodini (2013)). Epstein-Zin preferences with mortality
have been studied by Bommier et al. (2017) and Drouhin (2015) who find that
in household finance problems mortality risk effects dominate the others, while
the models of Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008)
yield seemingly opposite results which Bommier explains by the difference in the
value of life between these models (value of life is a measure of the utility benefit
of living longer). See also Hugonnier et al. (2012) and references therein for an
analysis of the interaction between health and mortality.
However we wish to examine the theoretical properties of preferences with
mortality more closely. We identify two particularly attractive models. The first
we call exponential preferences with mortality, it incorporates mortality into the
preference models of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974); Kihlstrom (2009). The sec-
ond we call homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality, it incorporates
mortality into the preference models of Epstein and Zin (1989). We will often
drop the qualifier “with mortality” when it is obvious from the context. We will
argue that exponential preferences have slightly better theoretical properties
than Epstein–Zin preferences, but that homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences
lead to particularly tractable problems.
A number of interesting concepts will arise from our discussion. We will
argue that the concept of pension adequacy is important. A pension is at the
adequacy level if one is indifferent between the outcomes of: living one more time
period with that income; dying immediately. The concept of pension adequacy
will emerge naturally when trying to model preferences and we shall see in our
numerical results that the optimal investment strategies are heavily determined
by the adequacy level. We will find that the key disadvantage of homogeneous
Epstein–Zin preferences is that they do not allow one to choose the adequacy
level separately from the risk-aversion parameters.
Two other concepts that emerge are satisfaction-risk-aversion and monetary-
risk-aversion which give two distinct operationalizations of the intuitive concept
of risk-aversion. We believe that satisfaction-risk-aversion accords better with
the intuitive notion of risk. According to our terminology an investor with classi-
cal von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences exhibits monetary-risk-aversion but
is satisfaction-risk-neutral. We believe that this indicates that investors with
von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences have an extreme attitude towards risk.
Hence preferences which exhibit satisfaction-risk-aversion are likely to be more
realistic.
The concepts of adequacy and satisfaction-risk-aversion imply the phenomenon
outlined in point (d) above. We will find in our numerical results that an in-
vestor who is satisfaction-risk-averse will consume earlier when they expect to
have an adequate pension and will consume later when they expect to have an
inadequate pension.
Section 2 is a brief description of our models for the market and for mortality.
Section 3 considers how to manage a fund on behalf of individuals once their
preferences are known. Modelling the market and idiosyncratic longevity risk are
relatively simple. More interesting is the question of how to use the preferences
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of each individual to determine the management strategy for a fund. In the
case that all the individuals in a fund are identical, we are able to write down
a single gain function for the entire fund and so reduce the problem of optimal
investment to a dynamic programming problem. We also show that the gain
function chosen for the fund may be justified either using the ideas of robust
optimization or using the notion of “The Veil of Ignorance” introduced in Rawls
(1971).
Section 4 we prove some basic properties of our formal model (which is
composed of the preference, market, mortality and fund management models).
We prove that under rather general conditions collectivisation is beneficial. We
also give sufficient conditions under which constant consumption is optimal.
This result explains the intuition that an annuity is a desirable form of pension
investment. However, the sufficient conditions are necessarily extremely strong
in order to ensure that none of the phenomena (a)–(d) above occur.
Section 5 considers how to manage heterogeneous funds containing investors
with varying preferences, budget and mortality. We do not know how to write
down a single gain function for the entire fund in this case and so do not know
how to formulate an optimization problem for the entire fund. Any attempt to
do this would require operationalizing “fairness” and so would likely be highly
controversial. Instead we pursue an axiomatic approach which allows us to
derive an upper bound on the gain function of each individual on the assumption
that the fund is “acceptable” to all its investors. We show that this upper bound
can be reached as n→∞. We also state a heuristic strategy which will achieve
individual gains very close to the upper limit even for small values of n, say
n & 100. Thus we may find a near-optimal strategy without ever formulating a
precise optimisation problem. The situation is analogous to the result that delta
hedging is an optimal hedging strategy in the Black–Scholes–Model irrespective
of the trader’s preferences.
To implement this near-optimal strategy, one simply needs to be able to
compute the optimal investment strategies for homogeneous funds of n identi-
cal individuals. The companion paper Armstrong and Buescu (2019b) shows
how to compute analytically the optimal investment strategy in the case of ho-
mogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences in the Black–Scholes–Merton market. The
companion paper Armstrong and Buescu (2019a) gives a numerical method to
compute numerically the optimal investment strategy in the case of exponential
Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences.
Section 6 completes our program by computing optimal investment strategies
for funds with reasonably realistic assumptions. We extend the modelling as-
sumptions of Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) (2019) to obtain a stochas-
tic market model. We use the the model of Mortality Projections Committee
(2019) for mortality. We are then able to quantify the advantage of collectivised
investment over an individual fund and over an annuity. We find for our ex-
ample that one needs a 20% larger pension fund for an annuity compared to a
collective fund in order to achieve equivalent retirement outcomes.
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We test our algorithm for managing a heterogeneous fund numerically, using
an artificially constructed population. We find that even for a fund with only
100 investors, one can achieve retirement outcomes that are within a couple of
percentage points of the theoretical optimal value.
1 Modelling preferences with consumption and
mortality
We begin by choosing how to model preferences between pension outcomes.
We model a “pension outcome” as a pair (γ, τ) consisting of a stochastic
process γt, representing the payment received at time t, and a random variable
τ representing the time of death. The underlying filtered probability space will
be denoted by (Ω,F ,Ft,P). The units of γt should be taken to be in real terms
to ensure that our models for inflation and preferences are separate.
We consider both discrete and continuous cashflow processes γt. We write T
for the set of time indices which may be either [0, T ) or the evenly spaced time
grid {0, δt, 2δt, 3δt, . . . , T − δt} where T is an upper bound on an individual’s
possible age which may be infinite. We write dT (t) for the measure determined
by the index set: this will be the Lebesgue measure on [0,∞) in the continuous
case, or the sum of Dirac masses of mass δt at each point in T for the discrete
case. It will occasionally be convenient to allow the cashflow γt to be non-
zero when t > τ , but this cash will not be consumed. In the discrete case we
assume that cashflow at the moment of death γτ is still consumed. So the total
consumption over the lifetime of an individual is∫ τ
0
γt dT (t).
We wish to describe an individual’s preferences over pension outcomes. This
will be represented by an ordering  on the set of pairs (γ, τ). The outcome
(γ, τ) is considered preferable to the outcome (γ˜, τ˜) if (γ˜, τ˜)  (γ, τ). We define
 in the obvious way and write x ∼ y if x  y and y  x. We assume that
an individual is indifferent to cashflows after death. This can be expressed
mathematically as
(∀t ≤ τ γt = γ˜t) =⇒ (γt, τ) ∼ (γ˜t, τ).
We are only interested in non-negative cashflows, so we usually require that
(γt, τ)  (γ′t, τ ′) (1.1)
whenever γt1t≤τ (t) is negative on a set of positive measure. (We write 1X for
the indicator function of a set X).
We first discuss a number of different possible preference models and then
consider their theoretical pros and cons.
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1.1 Definitions of preference relations
Definition 1.1. Von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences with mortality are
determined by a choice of concave, increasing utility function u : R≥0 → R
and a discount rate b. The preferences for (u, b) on pension outcomes with
non-negative cashflows are
(γ, τ)  (γ˜, τ˜) ⇐⇒ E
(∫ τ
0
e−btu(γt)dT (t)
)
≤ E
(∫ τ˜
0
e−btu(γ˜t)dT (t)
)
.
(1.2)
This definition is based on Morgenstern and von Neumann (1953). We shall
call these CRRA preferences with mortality when u is a constant relative risk-
aversion utility function. If one does not insist on the condition (1.1), u should
instead be defined on the whole of R.
Note that the discount factor e−bt is applied after u, so this is not cash
discounting but utility discounting. The parameter b measures an individual’s
preference for early consumption over late consumption. We emphasize that we
assume that the cashflows γt are given in real terms and so have no need for
cash discounting.
Note that the integrals in our definition of the preference relation may be
infinite. We follow the conventions of Rockafellar (2015) in handling such in-
finities. We may extend the definition of u to the whole of R by requiring that
u(x) = −∞ for negative values of x. If we do this then our conventions ensure
that (1.2) remains valid for negative cashflows. We will often follow similar con-
ventions throughout the paper without comment, but will highlight any points
where there is likely to be any confusion.
Definition 1.2. Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with mortality are determined
by a choice of concave, increasing utility function u : R≥0 → R, a second
increasing function w : R → R and a discount rate b. The preferences for
(u,w, b) on pension outcomes are
(γ, τ)  (γ˜, τ˜) ⇐⇒ E
(
w
(∫ τ
0
e−btu(γt) dT (t)
))
≤ E
(
w
(∫ τ˜
0
e−btu(γ˜t) dT (t)
))
.
This definition is based on Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). Von Neumann-
Morgernstern preferences arise in the special case w(x) = x. We will call the
case w(x) = −e−x and b = 0 exponential preferences. If one does not insist
upon (1.1), u should instead be defined on the whole of R.
We now define a version of homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences Epstein
and Zin (1989) which incorporate mortality. It is convenient to use the following
notion of “extended positive reals” which incorporates infinite and infinitesimal
values in order to give a neat definition of homogenenous Epstein–Zin prefer-
ences with mortality.
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Definition 1.3. The extended positive reals R++ is the set
R++ = R+ ∪ {α | α ∈ R \ {0}}
where  is a formal symbol representing an infinitesimal value. We extend
addition, multiplication and raising to a real power to R++ in the obvious way:
x+ α =
{
x when α > 0
α otherwise
α + β = min{α,β}
xα = α
αβ = α+β
(α)β = αβ
For example 
1
α should be thought of as an infinitesimal value if α < 1 and
as an infinite value if α > 1.
Definition 1.4. Homogeneous Epstein–Zin utility with mortality is defined in
discrete time and depends on parameters α ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0},
and 0 < β = e−bt ≤ 1. It is the R++-valued random variable defined recursively
by
Zt(γ, τ) =
{

1
α t > τ ;[
γρt + β Et(Zt+δt(γ, τ)α)
ρ
α
] 1
ρ otherwise.
(1.3)
Assuming γ0 is deterministic, Z0 is deterministic, so we may define homogeneous
Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality by
(γ, τ)  (γ˜, τ˜) ⇐⇒ Z0(γ, τ)  Z0(γ˜, τ˜).
Having stated these definitions, we should pause to describe how the various
parameters can be interpreted.
Adequacy
One concept that emerges from our definitions is the concept of pension ade-
quacy.
Definition 1.5. An adequacy level for preferences  is a random process such
that one is indifferent between dying at a particular time and living longer while
receiving an income at the adequacy level. Formally, an Ft-adapted, process at
is an adequacy level for the preferences  if
(i) τ < τ˜ ;
(ii) ∀t ∈ [0, τ ] : γt = γ˜t;
(iii) and ∀t ∈ (τ, τ˜ ] : γ˜t = at.
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together imply (γ, τ) ∼ (γ˜, τ˜). If death is better than any finite cashflows we
will say that the adequacy level is∞. If death is worse than any finite cashflows
we will say that the adequacy level is −∞.
For example, for von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences with mortality,
at = u
−1(0) is an adequacy level. For classical von Neumann–Morgernstern
preferences without mortality, the utility function u is only defined up to affine
transformation, and so adding a constant to u does not affect the preferences.
By contrast, for many control problems, the adequacy level of von Neumann-
Morgernstern preferences with mortality will be important. For example, in the
macabre problem of deciding whether or not to end one’s life given one’s future
financial prospects, pension adequacy will be a significant parameter (though
note that in any control model for mortality one would surely include a large
cost penalty to suicide, and the religiously inclined might make this penalty
infinite). Another possible problem where adequacy would clearly be important
would be in deciding whether to forego consumption in exchange for increased
healthcare.
Intuitively one might also expect pension adequacy to be important in in-
vestment decisions. This is indeed the case for our more general preferences,
but it is interesting to observe that in control problems using von Neumann–
Morgernstern preferences with mortality where one cannot control τ , the ade-
quacy level will always be irrelevant.
This is simply because
E
(∫ τ
0
(u(γt) + c) dT (t)
)
= E
(∫ τ
0
u(γt) dT (t)
)
+ E
(∫ τ
0
cdT (t)
)
.
The term on the right is independent of the cashflows γ and so the preferences
are unchanged when one adds a constant c to the utility function u.
From the point of view of parsimony, this property of von Neumann–Morgern-
stern preferences is appealing, as there is one less parameter to consider when
solving investment-only problems with these preferences. On the other hand, if
one believes that pension adequacy is an important factor to consider in pension
investment, this property of von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences is unde-
sirable.
Risk-aversion and satiation
Both Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences and homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences
can be applied to deterministic pension outcomes (γ, τ). We see from this that
the parameters w and α have no impact upon deterministic outcomes and so can
be viewed as capturing the aspect of an individual’s preferences determined by
the uncertainty of the outcome. On the other hand u and ρ capture the aspect of
the individual’s preferences determined by their preference to have consumption
spread out over time presumably because they experience diminishing returns
on consumption at a fixed time point. We say that u and ρ operationalize the
concept of satiation.
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Both models have the same aim of separating preferences into risk pref-
erences and satiation preferences. As we shall explain in more detail later,
“risk-aversion” is an ambiguous concept once one considers consumption over
time. The concept of risk depends upon the notion of averaging. This raises the
question of whether one should define risk in terms of average cash equivalent
values or in terms of average utility. The former definition leads to what we will
call monetary-risk aversion the latter leads to what we will call satistfaction-risk
aversion.
As we shall see below, Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences are satisfaction-risk-
averse if w is concave. They are monetary-risk-averse if the map x→ w(Tu(x))
is concave where T is the maximum possible age. Von Neumann–Morgernstern
preferences correspond to the satisfaction-risk-neutral case w(x) = x.
Homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences are satisfaction-risk-averse if α ≤ ρ
and are always monetary-risk-averse. The case α = ρ leads to von Neumann–
Morgernstern preferences and so is satisfaction-risk-neutral.
We believe that most reasonable models of preferences will be satisfaction-
risk-averse. As evidence for this claim we refer the reader to the formulae for
consumption under homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality that
are derived in Armstrong and Buescu (2019b). We find that the pattern of con-
sumption in the case where ρ < α is extremely hard to interpret as a reasonable
risk-averse investment-consumption strategy. If one accepts that “satisfaction-
risk-aversion” is the better operationalization of the intuitive concept of risk-
aversion, then this implies that being satisfaction-risk-neutral shows an extreme
attitude towards risk.
Discounting of utility
Although we have defined all our preferences with a choice of discount rate b,
this will typically be set to 0 when we computing optimal investment strategies.
This is an important difference between our approach and that of, for example,
Epstein and Zin (1989) and so we believe it merits further discussion.
The principal reason for this is that our investigation is primarily normative
rather than descriptive. We believe that the future preferences of pensioners
should be given as much weight as their current preferences. The mathematical
translation of this last statement is simply: b = 0.
We note Epstein and Zin in Epstein and Zin (1989) are clearly interested in a
descriptive theory. Indeed they remark that in deciding between different models
one should “let the data speak.” We find it very plausible that individuals will
prioritise immediate gratification over future consumption even if they may then
live to regret this decision. A non-zero discount rate seems very reasonable in
this context.
A second possible reason for including a non-zero discount rate would be
to model exogenous opportunities and risks. However, the models we will use
for pension investments are intended to model the entire available market. The
philosophy of our model will be that if there is some important investment
opportunity, it should be incorporated into the market model and not into
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the preferences. We have a similar philosophy to risks. We have incorporated
longevity risk into our model and so it makes no sense to discount future utility
to account for the fact that one might not live to enjoy it. It is revealing in
this context to note that optimal investment in the Black–Scholes model with
von Neumann–Morgernstern utility without mortality and a discount rate b
is equivalent to von Neumann–Morgernstern utility with mortality following
an exponential distribution with intensity b (see the HJB equation derived in
Armstrong and Buescu (2019a) for a justification of this claim).
A third, technical, reason for including a non-zero discount rate is that it
allows one to assign a utility to a cashflow that pays a constant amount for all
time. Such cashflows are useful if one wishes to compute steady states in infinite-
horizon problems (see also the notion of “constancy equivalent” in Oscar Lau
(2019)). Since we believe that time of death is bounded above, such cashflows
are irrelevant for realistic pension investment problems. We note that one of
the principle achievements of Epstein and Zin (1989) was to extend the theory
of Kreps and Porteus (1978) to infinite time horizons, so it is very natural that
Epstein and Zin should assume a non-zero utility discount rate.
In summary we believe the choice b = 0 is the most appropriate discount
rate for our models, but we happily accept that other choices will be appropriate
in other contexts.
1.2 A justification of Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with
mortality
The starting point for any theory of preferences is the utility theory of Morgen-
stern and von Neumann (1953). They show that under modest assumptions, a
preference relation  between random variables X and Y representing cashflows
at a fixed point in time can be written in the form
X  Y ⇐⇒ E(u(X)) ≤ E(u(Y ))
for some function u : R→ R.
In this section we wish to develop a similar theory of preferences with mor-
tality that explains under what circumstances one might be lead to choose
Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with β = 0. We will describe a chain of “ax-
ioms” that lead one to naturally introduce such preferences. We do not intend
to suggest our “axioms” below are necessary for a working theory of preferences:
they are simply properties one might consider desirable. Also note that we are
not trying to build our theory from basic axioms. We are happy to incorporate
utility functions directly into our “axioms”. One consequence of this approach
will be that some of axioms will be made redundant by later axioms.
Since the classical utility theory covers both positive and negative cashflows,
for the remainder of this section we will drop the requirement given by (1.1) and
allow our preferences to distinguish between different non-positive cashflows.
Axiom 1a. (Time indifference) For deterministic outcomes (γ, T ), (γ˜, T ) the
preference relation  only depends upon the distribution function of γ over time.
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The distribution function is defined by
Fγ(x) =
∫ T
0
1γt≤x dT (t).
This axiom ensures that any rearrangement of γ in time will be equally
preferable to γ. This axiom automatically precludes any discounting of utilities.
We emphasize that there may be good reasons for thinking that preferences are
time dependent, for example due to increased infirmity with age. However,
in our simple models which only attempt to consider pension investment and
death, we believe this is a reasonable axiom.
Axiom 1b. The upper bound, T , on the age is finite. So (γ, τ) is admissible
only if τ < T .
Axiom 1c. There is a constant, deterministic adequacy level a ∈ R∪{−∞,∞}
for the preference relation .
Axioms 1b and 1c allows us to pad out an admissible pension outcome (γ, τ)
at the adequacy level to obtain an equivalent outcome (γ˜, T ).
The classical theory of von Neumann and Morgernstern makes a similar
assumption to Axiom 1a. Specifically they assume that preferences between
random variables X and Y depend only upon their distribution function. The
measure space ([0, T ],dT (t)) is, up to a constant scale factor, equivalent to
the standard probability space ([0, 1], µ) where µ is the Lebesgue measure. We
conclude that the problem of choosing preferences over deterministic cashflows
up to time T is measure-theoretically isomorphic to the problem studied by von
Neumann and Morgernstern. This justifies our next axiom.
Axiom 1d. Preferences between deterministic cashflows (γ, T ) and (γ˜, T ) are
described by a utility function u : R ∪ {a} → R with
(γ, T )  (γ˜, T ) ⇐⇒
∫ T
0
u(γt) dT (t) ≤
∫ T
0
u(γ˜t) dT (t).
Due to Axiom 1c we require additionally that u(a) = 0. Note that u is only
determined up to scale.
It now follows from Axiom 1c that for any deterministic pension outcomes
(γ, τ)  (γ˜, τ˜) ⇐⇒
∫ τ
0
u(γt) dT (t) ≤
∫ τ˜
0
u(γ˜t) dT (t).
We will call the random variable
sγ,τ (ω) =
∫ τ(ω)
0
u(γt(ω)) dT (t).
the satisfaction associated with (γ, τ). The central elements of Kihlstrom–
Mirman preferences with mortality and with b = 0 now emerge as a natural
axiom:
12
Axiom 2. The preference relation  is determined by the distribution of the
satisfaction and is described by a utility function w : R→ R:
(γ,τ)  (γ˜, τ˜) ⇐⇒ E(w(sγ,τ )) ≤ E(w(sγ˜,τ˜ )).
We have seen that the notion of “satisfaction” emerges naturally if one ac-
cepts Axioms 1a to 1d. We entirely agree that an individual’s true preferences
will not be time indifferent, and that a realistic adequacy level will not be fixed
throughout the life-course. However, we believe that if one asks what form
an individual’s preferences should take in a model that consciously chooses to
ignore any features of pension outcomes other than mortality and cashflows,
Axioms 1a to 1d are very reasonable.
Having performed what we consider to be the useful thought experiment of
what such a minimal model for preferences might look like, a more general model
that incorporates changing preferences throughout the lifecourse emerges. Our
next axiom is intended to be a replacement for Axioms 1a to 1d.
Axiom 1*. (Ω,Ft,P) is equipped with an adapted process ht and a function
u : R× (domh)→ R. The satisfaction is then defined by
sγ,τ (ω) =
∫ τ(ω)
0
u(γt, ht) dT (t).
More precisely, we need only require that u is defined up to scale.
Axiom 1* together with Axiom 2 gives a more general model of preferences
than the model given by Axioms 1a to 1d with Axiom 2.
In this model, one should think of h as representing health and similar
factors. Notice that in this model, instead of being indifferent to the time at
which cash is received, the individual is now indifferent to the time at which a
quantity of satisfaction u(γt, ht) dT (t) is received.
The classical Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with a non-zero discount fac-
tor b emerge as a special case where ht is the deterministic process t and
u(γt, ht) = e
−btu(γt). Although this is mathematically correct, we would ques-
tion whether this is a particularly natural model for changing preferences during
the lifecourse. In particular one cannot model increasing care costs with age and
the preference of recent retirees for higher consumption than older retirees with
a single discount factor. The two phenomena would require different signs for
b.
A serious consideration of the effects of health on consumption preferences is
beyond the scope of this paper. We note that such a discussion would surely lead
one to consider issues such as health insurance. We have deliberately chosen to
restrict our attention to the topics of preferences, investments and mortality.
Within this context Axioms 1a to 1d are natural. We will use the more
general framework allowed by Axiom 1* in Section 6, where we incorporate a
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deterministic state pension into our model by using a deterministically time-
varying u.
We have not yet imposed any restrictions upon the functions u and w oc-
curring in our preferences. We require that u is increasing to represent the fact
that more cash increases satisfaction. Similarly we require that w is increasing
to represent a preference for higher levels of satisfaction over lower levels.
Requiring that u is concave corresponds to the idea of satiation. This is the
assumption that there are diminishing returns at higher levels of consumption:
mathematically u′c1 ≤ u′c2 if c1 < c2.
Requiring that w is concave corresponds to satisfaction-risk-aversion. This
is the assumption that we would prefer to receive the satisfaction E(s) with
certainty than to receive a random satisfaction s. We note that Axiom 1d
and Axiom 1* both presuppose that satisfaction has additive properties, so it
is reasonable to take expectations of satisfaction. This is important because
the concept of risk-aversion is not topologically invariant and depends crucially
upon the additive structure of R.
There is an alternative additive structure one could consider, namely the
structure defined by the additivity of cash values. Given preferences satisfy-
ing our axioms, we may define the constant cash equivalent of a deterministic
cashflow (γ, τ) by
c(γ, τ) = u−1
(
1
T
∫ τ
0
u(γt) dT (t)
)
we may then write our preferences over non-deterministic cashflows as
(γ, τ)  (γ′, τ ′) ⇐⇒ E(w(Tu(c(γ, τ))) ≤ E(w(Tu(c(γ′, τ ′))).
This leads to the definition that these preferences are monetary-risk-averse if
the function x→ w(Tu(x)) is concave.
1.3 Theoretical properties of preferences with mortality
We describe various properties that a preference relation may possess and which
may be considered desirable.
Given cashflows γt defined on an interval t ∈ [a, b) and cashflows γ˜t defined
on an interval t ∈ [c, d) we define the concatenated cashflow on [a, b+ d− c) by
(γ ⊕ γ˜)t =
{
γt t ∈ [a, b)
γ˜t−b+c t ∈ [b, b+ d− c).
Definition 1.6. The preferences  are Markovian if for any cashflows γα,t, γβ,t
defined on the finite interval [0, a) with a of measure zero (i.e. a is not a grid
point in the discrete case) and any cashflows γ1,t, γ2,t defined on [a,∞)
(γα ⊕ γ1, τ)  (γα ⊕ γ2, τ) ⇐⇒ (γβ ⊕ γ1, τ)  (γβ ⊕ γ2, τ)
This definition captures the case when future preferences do not depend
upon the past.
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There is no logical reason to insist that preferences should behave in this
way: for example if one has purchased a house, the anticipated cost of housing
repairs might well affect one’s future preferences.
However Markovian preferences are desirable mathematically because they
result in more tractable problems. To be more specific, if one has non-Markovian
preferences then one must keep track of additional state variables when solving
optimal control problems and this increases the dimension of the Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation.
Markovian preferences are also desirable from the point of view of parsi-
mony. Using non-Markovian preferences raises the question of how to choose
the initial state of the preferences and this effectively increases the number of
model parameters one will need to justify.
Definition 1.7. The preferences  are stationary if for any cashflows γα,t de-
fined on a finite interval [0, a) with a of measure 0 and any cashflows γ1,t, γ2,t
defined on [0,∞)
(γα ⊕ γ1, τ)  (γα ⊕ γ2, τ) ⇐⇒ (γ1, τ − a)  (γ2, τ − a)
This definition captures the case when preferences over future cashflows re-
main constant in time. This implies Markovianity.
Stationary preferences are particularly parsimonious as one does not have to
justify how the preferences vary in time.
Stationary preferences are very attractive in infinite-horizon problems as
they lead to a time-symmetry of the HJB equation, which then allows the di-
mension to be reduced.
Our notion of stationary preferences corresponds to “stationarity of prefer-
ence” in Koopmans (1960)1. Other authors refer to “intertemporal consistency
of preference” (see Johnsen and Donaldson (1985)) and “recursive preferences”
(see Epstein and Zin (1989)). Intertemporal consistency is perhaps the most
common term in the literature, but we prefer not to use it as it can lead to
confusion between consistency in the sense of a symmetry (which is how the
term should be understood) and consistency in the sense of logical consistency
(there is nothing logically necessary about the property).
Lemma 1.8. Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with mortality are Markovian if
and only if w(x) = − exp(−mx + c) for some m ∈ R>0 and c ∈ R. They are
stationary only if one additionally has b = 0.
Proof. The function w in Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences is defined up to posi-
tive affine transformation. Hence the preferences will be Markovian if and only
if for any admissible γα,t and γβ,t defined on [0, a) and γ defined on [a,∞) we
1We say “corresponds to” because our set-up is slightly different from that in these other
papers so the correspondence is not exact.
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can find A > 0 and B such that
E
(
w
(∫ a
0
e−btγα,tdT (t) +
∫ ∞
a
e−btγt dT (t)
))
= AE
(
w
(∫ a
0
e−btγβ,tdT (t) +
∫ ∞
a
e−btγt dT (t)
))
+B.
The result for Markovian preferences is now clear. We may now specialise to
the case where w(x) = − exp(−x).
E
(
w
(∫ a
0
e−btγα,tdT (t) +
∫ ∞
a
e−btγt dT (t)
))
= AE
(
w
(∫ ∞
0
e−b(t−a)γt−a dT (t)
))
.
The preferences will be stationary if and only if this is equal to some affine
transformation applied to
E
(
w
(∫ ∞
0
e−btγt−a dT (t)
))
.
The result for stationary preferences follows.
Two additional properties that we wish to consider are law-invarance and
invariance.
Definition 1.9. The preferences  are law-invariant if they depend only on the
joint distribution of (γt, τ).
Recall that a mod 0 isomorphism is a measurable bijection from a full subset
of a probability space Ω onto a full subset of another probability space Ω′ with
measurable inverse. An automorphism of a filtered probability space is a mod
0 isomorphism of probability spaces that acts as a mod 0 isomorphism on each
element of the filtration.
Definition 1.10. The preferences  are invariant if for any automorphism, φ,
of the filtered probability space (Ω,Ft,P) we have that φ preserves .
Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with mortality are always law-invariant. How-
ever, the generalized preferences allowed by our Axiom 1* may not be law-
invariant due to the dependence upon ht. More subtly, preferences may be
defined entirely in terms of (Ω,Ft,P) yet still depend upon the filtration Ft
and so not be law-invariant. In particular Epstein–Zin preferences are not law-
invariant. Even in the case of preferences over a single random variable, law-
invariance is by no means essential. For example, one might consider robust
preferences which take the minimum utility as computed using a family of risk
measures (see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011) for an extensive discussion).
Neverthless, Epstein–Zin preferences and Kihlstrom-Mirman preferences are
defined using invariantly defined concepts such as expected utilities with respect
to the filtration. As a result these preferences will automatically be invariant.
See Armstrong (2018) for a detailed explanation of these concepts.
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In the literature, non-law-invariant preferences are usually discussed with
reference to an individual’s preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty
(see Kreps and Porteus (1978)).
While law-invariance is an attractive property we agree with Epstein and
Zin (Epstein and Zin (1989) p939) that it is not a logically necessary feature
of preferences. Epstein and Zin and the references they cite in defence of this
view focus on descriptive models. We would further add that if there are ex-
ogenous investment opportunities then early resolution of information is clearly
advantageous. However, against this, we note that the philosophy of our market
model will be that it represents all available investment opportunities, and so
in the context of our model a violation of law-invariance is harder to justify.
Where we do disagree slightly with Epstein and Zin is in their assertion:
Finally, note that if indifference to timing and the intertemporal con-
sistency of preferences are both assumed, then (Chew and Epstein
(1990)) an expected utility ordering is implied.
Our only disagreement is that they have not mentioned their implicit assumption
that b 6= 0. As we have seen, exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with
b = 0 are law-invariant and stationary. We note that Epstein and Zin do make
their assumption on b clear in the body of their paper. We highlight the issue
because there could be a danger of the reader believing our findings contradict
those of Chew and Epstein (1990).
A similar issue arises on page 951 of Epstein and Zin (1989) where they make
the following criticism of non-exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences:
Dependence upon the past is in principle sensible but the form which
this dependence takes above is implausible, since . . . 0 < β < 1
. . . the dependence on past consumption is greater as the past be-
comes more distant.
This criticism is not valid when β = 0. The criticism of exponential Kihlstrom–
Mirman preferences on the same page is simply that they are not time-consistent,
which is also not valid when β = 0.
We remark that we are not entirely convinced by Epstein and Zin’s criticism
of non-exponential preferences in the case when 0 < β < 1. The discount factor
β may model either: (i) an unjustified psychological bias towards preferring
early consumption; or (ii) a rational economic bias towards receiving cash flows
earlier due to opportunities and risks that are not modelled directly. In case
(ii), it seems prima facie reasonable that the earlier one takes advantage of such
an exogenous investment opportunity, the more impact it would have upon
subsequent preferences.
We have defined the notion of monetary risk-aversion for both Kihlstrom–
Mirman preferences and Epstein–Zin preferences. However, the definition of
monetary risk-aversion is different in each context. One important unifying
feature of monetary risk-aversion is that it implies the preferences are convex
as defined below.
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Definition 1.11. The preferences  are convex if for any γ and τ the set
{γ˜ | (γ, τ)  (γ˜, τ)}
is convex.
As we have seen, preferences are typically described using a gain function J
mapping pension outcomes to R ∪ {−∞,∞}. We will say that J is invariant
if it is preserved by filtration automorphisms. We will say that J is concave if
the function J (γ, τ) is concave as a function of γ for all τ .
We make two final, straightforward definitions of some obviously desirable
properties
Definition 1.12. The preferences are monotonic if (γ, τ)  (γ′, τ) if γt ≤ γ′t
for all t ∈ T .
Definition 1.13. A gain function does not saturate if whenever J (γ, τ) is finite
we have J(γ + , τ) > J (γ, τ) for all positive .
1.4 Epstein–Zin preferences
(Epstein and Zin, 1989) describes a general theory of stationary preferences that
extends the work of Kreps and Porteus (1978) to the infinite time setting. More-
over, they describe a specific form of stationary preferences that is extremely
tractable in practical applications. Their work extends the homogeneous pref-
erences proposed by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986).
The general form of Epstein–Zin preferences for a sequence of positive scalar
cashflows γt is given by
Zt(γ) = [γ
ρ
t + βµt(Zt+δt(γ))
ρ]
1
ρ . (1.4)
where µ is a certainty equivalent operator and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1)\{0} and 0 < β < 1.
Sometimes a normalization constant (1− β) is included in front of the γρt , but
this is not essential.
Since the sequence of cashflows γt is infinite, the equation (1.4) only defines
the utility as the solution of a fixed point problem. The discount factor β plays
an important role in the proof that the fixed point exists.
Given an adequacy level a and a pension outcome (γ, τ) we define γat to
the stream of cashflows equal to γt up to death and a after death. We may
then define the Epstein–Zin utility with mortality to be given by the standard
Epstein–Zin utility of γa.
We will be primarily interested in the specialization of this to the case where
µt(Zt+1(γ)) = Et(Zt+1(γ)α)
1
α
where α ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}. We refer to this case as homogeneous Epstein–Zin
preferences because they have the property that for λ > 0
Zt(λγ) = λZt(γ)
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This property will prove to be extremely useful. It implies a symmetry of the
HJB equation and allows us to solve some interesting problems analytically.
Our definition of Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality, equation (1.3),
has been chosen so that the defining equation (1.4) also holds. Our choice of
value for the utility when t > τ is determined by the requirement that positive
homogeneity still holds.
We note that Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality are somewhat simpler
than those without mortality as we do not require a fixed point argument to
show that they are well-defined. One consequence of this is that we are able to
include the case β = 1 in our definition.
Although the defining formula (1.4) is elegant, Epstein–Zin preferences are
a little easier to understand if one defines the signed power function by
spγ(x) =
{
xγ when γ > 0
−xγ when γ < 0
and defines the Epstein–Zin satisfaction, zt by
zt = spρ(Zt, ρ).
We may then write the defining equations of homogeneous Epstein–Zin prefer-
ences as follows
zt = γ
ρ
t + β sp
−1
α
ρ
(
Et
(
spα
ρ
(zt+δt)
))
. (1.5)
Written in this form it becomes clear that the Epstein–Zin satisfaction is an
additive quantity (as indicated by the plus sign). For deterministic cashflows,
these preferences simplify to
zt = γ
ρ
t + βzt+δt =
∞∑
i=0
βiγρiδt.
Hence ρ is a parameter measuring satiation. We also see from (1.5) that the
combination of parameters αρ can be interpreted as satisfaction-risk-aversion
parameter. The preferences are satisfaction-risk-averse if αρ ≤ 1, i.e. if α < ρ. In
the case that α = ρ the preferences are satisfaction-risk-neutral and degenerate
to von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences.
With this interpretation in place, we may return to the Epstein–Zin utility
itself Zt. We now see that this is the instantaneous cash equivalent value of zt.
Hence Zt can be interpreted as a cash value and we see that the parameter α is
a monetary-risk-aversion parameter.
We note that the choice of utility value for τ > t is forced upon us by the
requirement that our preferences are positive homogeneous and independent
of any cashflows that occur after death. This is a limitation of homogeneous
Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality. For α < 0 we must always assume that
being dead is preferable to any cashflow, for α > 0 we must assume that any
cashflow is preferable to being dead. These are both extreme positions to take
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on pension adequacy. Moreover, it is unfortunate that this view on pension
adequacy cannot be taken independently from one’s monetary-risk aversion.
Note that in the situation where α = ρ and the preferences degenerate to von
Neumann–Morgernstern preferences the pension adequacy level will not affect
investment decisions.
As we have seen, it is possible to consider inhomogeneous Epstein–Zin prefer-
ences with mortality and this allows greater flexibility in the choice of adequacy
level. However, this comes at the cost of analytic tractability. Furthermore our
definition of inhomogenous Epstein–Zin preferences require 0 < β < 1. We find
it difficult to decide how β should be chosen for normative investment questions.
1.5 Summary
We have discussed a number of possible models for preferences with mortality.
The main difference between preferences with mortality and without mortality
is that when considering mortality the concept of adequacy arises naturally.
We do not believe there is a single “correct” model for preferences. Some
desirable features of preferences are mutually contradictory, as proved in Chew
and Epstein (1990). Even in the case of preferences over cashflows at a single
point in time there is an extensive literature on the possible choices for prefer-
ences beyond those considered in Morgenstern and von Neumann (1953). One
must choose a model based on a mixture of theoretical arguments, parsimony,
tractability and empirical evidence. The most appropriate choice of preference
model will vary from problem to problem.
A summary of the different forms of preferences with mortality we have
considered is given in Table 1. For our purposes in normative pension modelling,
our discussion so far inclines us to viewing exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman as
the most theoretically satisfying choice. However, as we will see, homogeneous
Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality have the tremendous attractions of being
extremely tractable analytically and of being widely accepted in the economics
literature. Therefore we will study optimal pension investment using both of
these preference models.
We believe inhomogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality may also
provide an interesting alternative to exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences,
but we do not pursue this further in this paper.
2 Market and mortality models
We will assume that a fund may invest in a market determined by a filtered
probability space (ΩM ,FMt∈R+ ,PM ). In particular we will only consider contin-
uous time markets.
We assume there are k available assets and that the price of asset j at time
t in real terms is given by Sjt . Arbitrary quantities of assets can be bought or
sold at these prices. We assume that the asset 1 is risk free, so that S1t = e
rt
where r is the risk free rate. We assume as our no-arbitrage condition that there
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there is an equivalent measure QM such that e−rtSit is a Q-Martingale for each
i. We will call such a market an infinitely-liquid market.
We assume that there are n individuals. We assume that we have indepen-
dent random variables τi each representing the time of death of individual i.
These are assumed to be independent with distribution given by pit dT (t). We
will write (ΩL,FLt ,PL) for the filtered probability space generated by the τi,
the filtration is obtained by requiring that each τi is a stopping time. We will
write Fτ (t) for the distribution function of τ .
The assumption of independence means that we are only considering idiosyn-
cratic longevity risk. We hope to incorporate systematic longevity risk into our
models in future research.
We will write nt for the number of survivors at time t, that is the number of
individuals whose time of death is greater than or equal to t. This convention
ensures that n0 = n and works well with our convention that cashflows received
at the time of death are still consumed. Note, however, that nt+δt will be FLt
measurable.
3 Managing homogeneous funds
In this section we consider how to manage homogeneous funds. We call a fund
homogeneous if all individuals in the fund have identical preferences, wealth and
mortality. We will consider the management of heterogeneous funds in 5.
Since we assume that each individual has an identical mortality distribution
we may define pt := p
i
t.
Let us first consider the case of finite n.
We wish to decide how to manage a collective pension fund where individual
contributes an amount X0 at time 0. Individual i will receive an income γ
i
t at
time t, with γit = 0 if the individual is dead at that time. Any cash that is yet to
be consumed is invested in the market. There is no bequest when an individual
dies, all remaining cash is shared with the fund.
We refer to the case when n = 1 as the individual case. The case when n = 2
is of interest because it represents the case of a couple who wish to pool their
investments.
We will assume that the preferences of our individuals are given by a prefer-
ence relation over pension outcomes, i, which is in turn given by an individual
gain function Ji(γ, τi) which acts on pension outcomes. We assume that these
gain functions are invariant and each individual has an isomorphic gain function.
Possible individual gain functions include expected von Neumann–Morgernstern
utility, expected Kihlstrom–Mirman utility, and Epstein–Zin utility. If one uses
the same parameters for these gain functions for each individual, the resulting
gain functions will be isomorphic.
We need to choose an objective for the fund itself. We informally outline
two proposals which we will then explain in more detail.
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(i) Suppose that the individual gain function is law-invariant and so depends
only on the distribution of outcomes. We may understand “distribution”
to mean distribution in both probability and distribution across the pop-
ulation. In this way the individual gain function gives rise to an objective
for the entire fund. We will call this the “distribution approach”.
(ii) We follow the robust optimization approach to managing the fund: we
maximize the infimum of the individual gain functions.
Let us explain the mathematical detail required for the distribution ap-
proach. We suppose that the individual gain function is law-invariant. We
define a discrete uniformly distributed random variable ι which takes values in
{1, . . . , n}. We write (Ωι, σι,Pι) for the probability space generated by ι. We
define a filtration F ιt∈R+∪{∞} by
F ιt =
{
{Ωι, ∅} t <∞
σι t =∞.
Thus Ωι represents a random choice of individual made at time∞. If we have a
law-invariant individual gain function Jι defined relative to a probability space
Ω, we can then define a gain function relative to Ω× Ωι by requiring
JD(γ) = Jι(γι, τι). (3.1)
Note that since τι is not a stopping time, this gain function can only be given
a meaning for law-invariant individual gain functions Jι.
The gain function for the robust approach is given by
J R(γ) := inf
i∈I0
Ji(γi, τi). (3.2)
These two approaches are not equivalent in general. Consider the Biblical
problem faced by Solomon of distributing a child among two women who claim
to be its mother. In the distribution approach, giving the child to a randomly
selected woman would be optimal. In the robust approach, giving neither woman
the child would be an equally optimal alternative. For concave individual gain
functions, Solomon’s recommended approach of splitting the child in two would
be ideal.
Having decided on a gain function J for our fund, we can write down the
associated optimization problem.
We will take Ω⊥ to be any filtered probability space that can be used if
arbitrary decisions need to be made (such as choosing a random woman to give
the child) we can use random variables defined on this space. We then take
Ω = ΩM × ΩL × Ωι × Ω⊥ equipped with the product filtration Ft and product
measure P. As one might expect, under reasonable conditions, Ω⊥ proves to
be irrelevant, and the optimal strategies can be taken to be ΩM × ΩL × Ωι
measurable. See Remark 4.2 below.
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We then wish to choose progressively measurable consumption streams γit ≥
0 with t ∈ T and investment proportions αjt in asset j with t ∈ R+. We require∑k
j=1 α
j
t ≤ 1. We have an inequality in this equation, because it is acceptable,
if sub-optimal, to simply discard assets. We must choose these processes such
that the total wealth of the fund is always non-negative. We write A for the
resulting set of admissible controls (γ,α), and we will now give a fully precise
mathematical description of this set.
First let us write down the dynamics of the fund value. For continuous time
consumption the fund value satisfies the SDE
dFt =
k∑
i=1
αisFsdS
i
s −
n∑
i=1
γit dt (3.3)
with F0 =
∑n
i=1Bi, where Bi is the initial budget of individual i (in this section
we are assuming that all individuals have identical initial budget Bi = X0, but
the equations for the more general case will be useful later). For discrete time
consumption, let Ft denote the fund value before consumption and F t denote
the fund value after consumption. We then have the following budget equations
for the dynamics of Ft and F t.
Ft =

∑n
i=1Bi t = 0
limh→0+ F t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
F t otherwise.
F t =
{
Ft −
∑n
i=1 γ
i
t
F t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′ α
i
sF s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(3.4)
A strategy is (γ,α) is admissible if it ensures Ft ≥ 0 and F t ≥ 0 at all times.
Hence
A = {(γ,α) ∈ PM | Ft ≥ 0 and F t ≥ 0,∀t} (3.5)
where PM is the set of progressively measurable Rn × Rk valued processes for
the probability space Ω.
Our objective is to compute
vn = sup
(γ,α)∈A
J (γ). (3.6)
and to find (γ,α) achieving this supremum.
Notice that consumption always takes place at times in T which may be
a discrete time grid, whereas investment takes place in continuous time. This
trick will prove to be important in computing analytic solutions in the case of
discrete time consumption.
We will henceforth assume that our individual gain functions are concave.
Since the market is positively homogeneous, given a strategy (γ,α) we may form
a new strategy (γ¯,α) which assigns the mean consumption to all survivors:
γ¯it =
{
0 τi < t
1
nt
∑n
j=1 γ
j
t otherwise.
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The concavity of our individual gain functions ensures that for our fund’s gain
function we have
J (γ¯i, α) ≥ J (γi, α).
So we may assume without loss of generality that all survivors consume the
same amount γt at time t. Under this assumption we have that JD = J R,
so the distinction between the distributional approach and the robust approach
will not in fact be important. We will make this assumption from now on.
Our motivation for introducing the two approaches is that we believe the
distributional approach corresponds more closely to the intuitive notion of op-
timal investment for a collective fund, however the robust approach is required
if we wish to use Epstein–Zin utility as the individual gain function. To justify
our claim that the distributional approach is more intuitive we first note the
example of Solomon above. A second justification is given by the concept of
the “Veil of Ignorance” described in Rawls (1971). This concept suggests that
when making collective decisions one should make those decisions as though
the identity of the individuals was unknown. Our filtered probability space Ωι
represents this veil of ignorance: the veil being lifted at time∞, but the control
(γ, α) is chosen in a state of ignorance.
Having decided that the consumption, γt, should be the same for all indi-
viduals, we may now consider how to model infinite collectives (n =∞). When
performing accounting calculations in this case, we will perform all calculations
on a per-individual basis. For example, rather than keep track of the total fund
value which would be infinite, we keep track of the fund value per individual
which will be finite. We will assume that a deterministic proportion of the orig-
inal individuals dies over each time interval given by the integral of pt dT (t)
over that interval. This assumption allows us to include mortality within our
accounting.
Let us express this precisely. Let Yt represent the fund value per individual
at time t before consumption or mortality, and let Y t represent the fund value
per individual after consumption. Then in the continuous time case we have
dYt =
k∑
i=1
αisYsdS
i
s − pitγt dt (3.7)
where pit is the proportion of individuals surviving to time t. In the discrete
time case we have
Yt =

X0 t = 0
limh→0+ Y t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
Y t otherwise.
Y t =
{
Yt − pitγt t ∈ T
Y t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′ α
i
sY s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(3.8)
For the case n = ∞, equations (3.7) and (3.8) define the process Yt. In the
case n =∞, pit = 1− Fτ (t) is deterministic. For the case of finite n, equations
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(3.7) and (3.8) follow from (3.3) and (3.4). In the case of finite n, pit =
nt
n is a
random variable.
In the case n =∞ we take as the gain function for our fund
J (γ) := J1(γ, τ1). (3.9)
This is reasonable since we have assumed that all living individuals receive the
same consumption stream γt and have isomorphic preferences. Alternatively if
the individual gain function is law-invariant we may define a random variable τι
which is measurable only at ∞ and which has distribution ptdt. We may then
write the gain function as
J (γ) := Jι(γ, τι). (3.10)
These two formulations will be equivalent, but (3.10) seems a more intuitive
formulation.
We define the set A of admissible strategies in the case n = ∞ by saying
that a strategy is admissible if Yt ≥ 0 for all time. We may now define v∞ via
equation (3.6) as before.
We note that our approach to treating of the case n = ∞ is at present
rather heuristic, but it can be justified rigorously via limiting arguments. In
the paper Armstrong and Buescu (2019b) we prove that vn → v∞ in the case of
exponential preferences with mild assumptions on the market and the function
u. In the paper Armstrong and Buescu (2019a) we prove that for homogeneous
Epstein–Zin preferences in the Black–Scholes market vn = v∞ +O(n−
1
2 ).
4 Basic properties of collectivised investment
4.1 Collectivisation is beneficial
It is intuitively clear that collectivisation should be beneficial. We give a formal
proof within our model.
Theorem 4.1. For this model, if the individual gain functions Ji are concave
then
vn ≤ vm if n ≤ m <∞.
To be precise, we should note that in this formula we assume that the gain
function defined on the probability space of n individuals is the one induced
from the gain function defined on the probability space of m individuals. In
practice, preferences for all individuals will be defined invariantly by specifying
a model such as homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences with given values for the
parameters α, ρ and β so this will be automatic.
Moreover vn ≤ v∞ in complete markets.
In place of assuming that the market is complete, one may instead require
that admissible strategies are integrable.
Proof. We recall that, by assumption, the individual gain functions Ji are in-
variant and isomorphic. We note that to each permutation of the individuals
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we can associate an automorphism of the probability space which permutes the
individuals. Hence a strategy which is effective for one set of n individuals will
give rise to an isomorphic strategy for another set of n individuals.
Suppose that m is finite. Suppose we set up
(
m
n
)
funds corresponding to each
possible choice of n individuals from the full set of m individuals and allocate
the initial budget equally to each of these funds. Given an admissible strategy
which achieves a value v for the gain function for the first n individuals, we can
use it in each of these
(
m
n
)
funds. By the concavity of the gain function, we see
that the resulting strategy will have a value greater than or equal to v. The
result follows.
Now consider the case when m =∞. Let (γ,α) be an admissible strategy for
a collective of n investors. Our budget constraint together with the requirement
that the discounted asset prices are Q-measure martingales ensures that
EQ×PL
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫
e−rtγit dT (t)
)
≤ X0.
Note that γit is non-negative. Hence by Fubini’s theorem we may define a
stochastic process γt by
γt := EPL
(∫
e−rtγt dT (t) | St
)
≤ X0.
where St is the vector of asset prices at time t. This will be progressively
measurable with respect to the filtered probability space of the market (ΩM )
and moreover will satisfy
EQ
(∫
e−rtγt dT (t)
)
≤ X0.
It follows from our assumption that the market is complete that we can then find
α which ensures that (γ,α) is an admissible strategy for an infinite collective.
The concavity of the gain function now ensures that
Ji(γi, τi) ≤ Jι(γ, τι).
Hence v∞ ≥ vn.
If the market is not complete, we instead use the integrability of α in order
to define α by averaging.
Remark 4.2. When m 6= ∞ the proof above carries through to the case of
positively homogeneous markets (i.e. markets with a bid-ask spread).
4.2 When is constant consumption optimal?
Defined benefit pensions and annuities typically aim to provide constant con-
sumption stream in real terms. It is therefore natural to ask when constant
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consumption is optimal. Our next result gives sufficient conditions. We assume
for technical reasons that the asset price processes Sit are all given by diffu-
sion processes. We will call a market that satisfies this assumption a diffusion
market.
Theorem 4.3. Constant consumption is optimal for von Neumann–Morgernstern
preferences with b = 0 in complete diffusion markets with P = Q and r = 0 when
n = ∞. If pt = 0 for all times except T − δt then constant consumption is op-
timal for all n. For example, in a Black–Scholes–Merton market with no drift
and risk free rate of zero one has P = Q.
Proof. We will give our proof using symmetry arguments rather than direct
calculation. Our aim in using this approach is to explain why this result feels
“obvious”.
First consider the case n =∞.
By the classification of standard probability spaces, the filtered probability
space (Ω,Ft∈T ,P) is isomorphic to the Cartesian product (S1)T where S1 is the
circle of circumference 1. Note that we are using the assumption that we are
in a diffusion market to ensure that these probability spaces are standard and
atomless. Thus rotations of the circles give rise to market isomorphisms (see
Armstrong (2018) for a definition of market isomorphism). This gives an action
of the Lie group (S1)T on our market and hence on the space of admissible
investment strategies. Given any strategy we may apply these rotations to
obtain new, equivalent strategies. Choose an invariant metric on our Lie group,
so that we may define the average strategy. Note that we are using market
completeness here, just as we did in the proof of Theorem 4.1, to ensure that
the average strategy exists. By the concavity of our maximization problem and
Jensen’s inequality, this averaged strategy will outperform the original strategy.
But the averaged strategy will be invariant under the group action and hence
deterministic.
Since we may assume our strategy is deterministic, it will be a pure bond
investment so Yt+δt = Y˜t. From our dynamics (3.8) we have
Yt+δt = Yt − (1− Fτ (t))γt
Solving this difference equation yields the (intuitively obvious) budget constraint
0 ≤ X0 =
∫ T
0
(1− Fτ (t))γt dT (t). (4.1)
Where Fτ is the distribution function of τ . The expected utility is∫ T
0
(1− Fτ (t))u(γt) dT (t).
The result for n = ∞ is now easy to prove by brute force, but we wish to use
symmetry.
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Given a measurable space with non-negative, standard measure µ we can
consider the more general problem
maximize
γ∈L1(µ)
∫
u(γ)µ
subject to γ ≥ 0
and
∫
γ µ = X0
(4.2)
The optimization we wish to solve is just the special case with µ = (1 −
Fτ (t)) dT (t). If µ is isomorphic to an invariant measure m on the circle S1,
we can use the rotation argument above to prove that the optimizer is given by
constant γ∗, specifically γ∗ = X0∫
µ
.
For more general µ, suppose we are given a function γ which satisfies the
constraints. We let γ × 1 be the function on the space with product measure
µ × λ where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. But µ × λ is an atomless,
positive probability measure so is isomorphic to an invariant measure m on the
circle. Hence γ × 1 is outperformed by the constant function γ∗ on µ× λ. This
can be projected to a constant function γ∗ on µ. Since the objective functions
on µ× λ and µ are equal for functions which are constant on the λ factor, this
means that γ itself is outperformed by γ∗. Hence the constant function γ∗ is
optimal on µ itself.
In the case when pt = 0 for all times except T−δt, the optimization problems
for different values of n are all equivalent, so the result follows.
This result provides a mathematical explanation for the intuitive appeal of
annuities and defined benefit pensions. However, there is the obvious caveat
that the assumptions are extremely strong. One expects that with any slight
weakening of these assumptions, constant cashflows will no longer be optimal.
We prove such a converse in the case of Epstein–Zin preferences in the paper
Armstrong and Buescu (2019b).
One interpretation of this result that is worth noting is that it suggests
taking the discount rate b = 0 in our preferences will accord better with investor
expectations than choosing other values of b.
Remark 4.4. We note that the same averaging argument can be used to show
that the probability space Ω⊥ can be safely ignored in a complete market with
concave preferences.
5 Heterogeneous Funds
We now wish to consider how to manage consumption and investment when the
individuals are not identical.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are a finite number, `, of possible
initial types of investor {ζ1, . . . , ζ`}. We write Z for the set of types of investor.
Each type ζ describes the initial capital, mortality distribution and preferences
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of the individual. Our argument will carry through with appropriate modifica-
tions to the case of a compact space of types rather than a finite set of types.
However, giving such an account would increase the technical burden to little
real purpose.
It is hypothetically appealing to identify the optimal investment strategy
for the heterogeneous fund. However, we would need to define optimality, and
this will require us to specify preferences over outcomes between different types
of investor. Describing such preferences seems challenging and the choice of
preferences would be controversial.
Instead we will take an axiomatic approach. Rather than find an optimal
scheme for managing a fund we merely seek an acceptable management scheme.
We will define the notion of acceptable axiomatically, and will show that for
large funds all acceptable management schemes yield similar outcomes for the
investors.
We assume that the preferences of an individual of type ζ are given by a
concave, invariant gain function Jζ(γ, τ). Let us write v(n, ζ) for the value
function for individuals of type ζ investing in this market in a collective of size
n as modelled in Section 3.
We assume that
lim
n→∞ v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ).
Sufficient conditions to ensure this are described in the papers Armstrong and
Buescu (2019a) and Armstrong and Buescu (2019b).
The initial population is determined by a vector ζ ∈ Zn, where component
i of ζ denotes the type of the i-th individual. A management scheme M is a
function acting on vectors ζ of arbitrary length n and which yields a strategy
(γ,α) where γt is a vector of consumptions of length n with i-th component
being the consumption of individual i, and α is an investment strategy. We
require that the combined consumption and investment are self-financing. Thus
M :
∞⊔
n=1
Zn →
∞⊔
n=1
L0(Rn × Rk).
and M maps the i-th component of the first union into the i-th component of
the second union.
Our first axiom forM is one of fairness, which as we have seen is a property
that arises automatically in any concave maximization problem.
Axiom I1. All surviving individuals of type ζ consume the same amount. That
is
(i) if M(ζ) = (γ,α) then γit = γjt when ζ(i) = ζ(j), t ≤ τi and t ≤ τj.
(ii) If ζ′ is obtained by permuting the elements of ζ, then M(ζ′) is obtained
by the corresponding permutation of the consumption streams of M(ζ)
Let the proportions of different individuals prevailing in the population be
given by a vector of weights ω(ζ) = (ωζ1 , . . . , ωζ`) with 0 < ωζ < 1, ωζ rational
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and
∑
ζ∈Z ωζ = 1. Let lcm(ω) denote the lowest common multiple of the
denominators of the fractions ωi, so we know that the population is some integer
multiple of lcm(ω).
By Axiom I1 we may define
aM(ω, n, ζ)
to be the value of the gain function achieved by an individual of type ζ for a
population of size n. This is defined if n is any integer multiple of lcm(ω).
If aM(ω, n, ζ) < v(nωζ , ζ) then the investment strategy for the heteroge-
neous fund will not be able to attract investors of type ζ as they would be
better off following the strategy of Section 3. Theorem 4.1 then suggests that
this would be to the detriment of all other investors in the heterogeneous fund,
as increasing collectivisation should always be beneficial. These observations
motivate the following axioms.
Axiom I2. A management scheme is monotone if:
aM(ω,m, ζ) ≤ aM(ω, n, ζ)
if m ≤ n.
Axiom I3. A management scheme achieves the performance standard if
aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(nωζ , ζ).
for all n and ζ.
Definition 5.1. A management scheme is acceptable if it satisfies Axioms I1,
I2 and I3.
By the monotonicity property, we may unambiguously define
aM(ω,∞, ζ) = lim
n→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ).
By the performance standard and our assumption on the convergence of v(n, ζ)
as n→∞ we see that for any acceptable management scheme
aM(ω,∞, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ). (5.1)
The scheme of simply grouping all individuals of a given type together into a
homogeneous fund and managing that according to the model of Section 3 will
yield an acceptable management scheme which achieves the lower bound (5.1).
We call this the basic management scheme.
We wish to show that the basic management scheme is asymptotically op-
timal in complete markets. The key observation is that collective investment
provides no substantive benefit for the investment problem in a complete market
without mortality.
Let us consider how to write a collective investment problem for n individ-
uals without mortality investing in our market. We choose consumption γit for
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individual i, and overall investment proportions αt. The total fund value will be
given by the budget equations (3.4), and hence the set of admissible controls for
this problem will be given by (3.5). The difference will be that the preferences of
the individual will depend only upon cashflows received and not upon mortality,
so we will suppose that for individual i we have a gain function Jˆi(γit) which
depends only upon the cashflows. We define the value function
vˆi := sup
A1
Jˆi(γit)
where An is the set of acceptable admissible controls for n individuals. Although
we have defined the set of admissible controls for n individuals, we do not write
down an optimization problem for n individuals as we do not know what the
objective should be across a heterogeneous collective.
Our next result shows that in a complete market without mortality there
is no real benefit in considering collectivised problems as, however we select an
admissible control (by solving an optimization problem or otherwise), it will
never bring a substantive advantage to any individual unless it also gives a
substantive disadvantage to some other individual. In other words, one cannot
pay Paul without robbing Peter.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose the gain functions Jˆi(γt) are concave, monotone and do
not saturate8 and satisfy Jˆi(γt) > −∞ for positive cashflows γt . Suppose that
Jˆi(γt) = −∞ whenever γt is negative on a set of finite measure.
Let i∗ be an individual, then for any 1 > 0 there exists 2 > 0 such that
for any admissible investment consumption strategy for all the investors with γi
satisfying
Jˆi∗(γi∗t ) ≥ vˆi∗ + 1 (5.2)
there is an investor i such that
Jˆi(γit) ≤ vˆi − 2.
Proof. Let us write vi(b) for the value function for individual i as a function of
their budget b. By Lemma (5.3) below, vi is continuous as a function of b for
any b > 0. We write Bi for the budget of individual i.
In a complete market, we call a measurable non-negative cashflow γt a deriva-
tives contract and we call the discounted Q-measure expectation of γt the price
of this contract. This price may be infinite, which means that the cashflows can-
not be super-replicated by any admissible trading strategy. If the price is finite,
the contract can be replicated by an admissible trading strategy with initial
budget given by the price. Note that the requirement that γt is non-negative
ensures that the price of derivative contracts is additive: if negative infinities
were allowed as prices this would not be the case.
If we write Db for the set of derivatives contracts of price less than or equal
to b, we have:
vˆi(b) = sup
γ∈Db
Jˆ (γ).
8The definitions of these terms were given for gain functions over cashflows with mortality,
but the corresponding definitions for Jˆ should be obvious
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Here we have used our assumption that negative cashflows yield a value of −∞
for the gain function.
By the continuity of vi∗ , there is a price, δ, such that if Jˆi∗(γi∗t ) ≥ vi∗ + 1,
then the price of the derivative contract with payoff γi∗t is at least Bi∗ + δ.
By the monotonicity and non-saturation of the gain functions, together with
the concavity given by Lemma (5.3) below
vˆi
(
Bi − δ
`− 1
)
< vˆi(Bi).
Let
2 = inf
i6=i∗
{
vˆi(Bi)− vˆi
(
Bi − δ
2(`− 1)
)}
.
Any derivative contract with cashflows γi satisfying
Jˆi(γit) ≤ vˆi − 2.
will cost at least Bi − δ2(`−1) . Hence the total cost of an investment strategy
yielding all the cashflows γi is at least
Bi + δ +
∑
i 6=i∗
(
Bi − δ
2(`− 1)
)
=
∑
i
Bi +
δ
2
which is greater than the total budget and hence cannot be admissible.
Lemma 5.3. Consider investment without mortality in a homogeneous market.
Suppose an individual’s gain function over consumption, Jˆ (γ), is concave and
monotone. Let Ab be the set of admissible consumption, investment strategies
with initial budget b. Define
vˆ(b) = sup
(γ,α)∈Ab
Jˆi(γ).
The function v is concave and hence v is continuous on any open set on which
it is finite.
Proof. Given two budgets b1, b2 > b then let (γi, αi) be admissible strategies
for each budget. So for any λ ∈ [0, 1], (λγ1 + (1− λ)γ2, λα1 + (1− λ)α2) is an
admissible strategy with budget λb1 + (1− λ)b2. By the concavity of Jˆ ,
Jˆ (λγ1 + (1− λ)γ2) ≥ λJˆ (γ1) + (1− λ)Jˆ (γ2).
Hence
vˆ(λb1 + (1− λ)b2) ≥ λvˆ(b1) + (1− λ)vˆ(b2).
Remark 5.4. Lemma 5.2 is only true in complete markets. If two individuals
have different risk or consumption preferences in an incomplete market then it
can often be beneficial to design a derivatives contract to the mutual advantage of
both parties. This is the essential purpose of derivatives contracts and explains
why there is a market for such contracts.
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We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.5. For any acceptable management scheme in a complete market
with consumption in discrete time
aM(ω,∞, ζ) = v(∞, ζ)
so long as all individual gain functions are concave, monotone, invariant and
do no saturate, and so long as
lim
n→∞ v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ) > −∞.
for any positive budget.
Proof. By Axiom I3, limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ limn→∞ v(nωζ , ζ). By assumption
limn→∞ v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ). Hence a(ω,∞, ζ) = limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ).
Let us now define the meaning of an admissible strategy for an infinite het-
erogeneous collective where the types of each individual are given by the pro-
portions ω. We will assume that surviving individuals of a given type, ζ, all
consume γζt at time t. Hence the total consumption per person (i.e. of any type,
including both survivors and the deceased) is∑
ζ∈Z
γζt pi
ζ
t ω
ζ
where piζt denotes the proportion of individuals of type ζ who survive to time t.
Note that piζt = 1− Fτζ (t) where τζ is a random variable distributed according
to the time-of-death distribution for individuals of type ζ.
If we let Yt denote the fund value per person before consumption and Y t
denote the fund value per person after consumption we have the following bud-
get equations for the dynamics of Yt and Y t. Let us write B
ζ for the initial
budget of individuals of type ζ. Then the fund value per person for the infinite
heterogenous collective should be defined to follow the dynamics
Yt =

∑
ζ∈Z ω
ζBζ t = 0
limh→0+ Y t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
Y t otherwise.
Y t =
{
Yt −
∑
ζ∈Z γ
ζ
t pi
ζ
t ω
ζ t ∈ T
Y t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′ α
i
sY s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(5.3)
We may alternatively view the equations above as describing the dynamics
of a fund of “virtual individuals” where each virtual individual represents the
interests of an infinite fund of individuals all of type ζ. To see this, we define
γˆζt = γ
ζ
t pi
ζ
t ω
ζ . We say that virtual individual ζ consumes an amount γˆζt at each
time t ∈ T . We say that the initial budget of virtual individual ζ is ωζBζ . We
may now view equation (5.3) as giving the dynamics of the total fund value
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before consumption Yt of a collective of these heterogeneous virtual individuals.
This observation will allow us to apply Lemma 5.2 to the collective investment
problem with mortality.
Let us define a gain function (without mortality) Jˆζ for the virtual individual
ζ by
Jˆζ(γˆζt ) := Jζ(γζt , τζ)
Let us write vˆζ(b) for the value function of a virtual individual with this gain
function with an initial budget b. We see that vˆζ(ω
ζBζ) = v(∞, ζ).
Suppose (γ,α) is a strategy for the infinite heterogeneous collective and let
ζ∗ be a chosen type of individual. It follows by Lemma 5.2 that for any given
1 > 0 such that
Jˆζ∗(γˆζ∗t ) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + 1 (5.4)
there exists 2 > 0 and a type ζ such that
Jˆζ(γˆζt ) ≤ v(∞, ζ)− 2. (5.5)
Hence given any 1 > 0 such that
Jζ∗(γζ∗t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + 1 (5.6)
there exists 2 > 0 and a type ζ such that
Jζ(γζt , τζ) ≤ v(∞, ζ)− 2. (5.7)
Now let us suppose for a contradiction that for some 1 > 0, ζ∗ andN we have
a(ω,N, ζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗)+21. Note that we then have a(ω, n, ζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗)+21
for all n ≥ N . We may then choose 2 > 0 as described in the preceding
paragraph.
There are only finitely many types ζ and we know limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥
v(∞, ζ). So for sufficiently large n we may assume that
aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ)− 132.
Hence for such n we may find an investment-consumption strategy (γ,α) for a
collective of n individuals which yields the same consumption for all surviving
individuals of a given type and which satisfies
Jζ∗(γζ∗t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + 1
and which also satisfies
Jζ(γζt ,ζ ) ≥ v(∞, ζ)− 232
for all types ζ.
Since the discounted asset prices Sit are Q-martingales we have
EQ×PL
∑
ζ∈Z
∫
e−rtωζγζt dT (t)
 ≤∑
ζ∈Z
ωζBζ .
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Since the consumption γt is non-negative we have by Fubini’s theorem that
γζt := EPL
(∫
e−rtωζγζt dT (t) | St
)
is a progressively measurable process for the filtered probability space (ΩM ,Ft,PM )
and satisfies ∑
ζ∈Z
EQ
(∫
e−rtωζγζt dT (t)
)
≤
∑
ζ∈Z
ωζBζ .
By the complete market assumption we can then find an investment strategy α
that funds γ. Hence we have found an admissible strategy (γ,α) for the infinite
homogeneous collective which by the concavity of the preferences will satisfy
Jζ∗(γζ∗t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + 1
and which also satisfies
Jζ(γζt ,ζ ) ≥ v(∞, ζ)− 232
for all types ζ. This contradicts equations (5.6) and (5.7).
We deduce that a(ω,N, ζ) ≤ v(∞, ζ) for all ζ, which gives the result.
The financial significance of Theorem 5.5 is that it means that all acceptable
strategies are asymptotically equivalent in a complete market, in particular this
applies to the Black–Scholes–Merton market.
The result is analogous to the classical result that in the Black–Scholes–
Merton market any derivative has a unique price independent of the preferences
of the investor. This too is an asymptotic result, in the sense that it assumes
continuous time and zero transaction costs.
Of course, in practice no two individuals are alike and so our assumption of
a finite number of distinct types can rightly be criticised. However, we expect
that simple modifications of this strategy will yield good results if there are a
large number of similar individuals. We propose the following algorithm.
Algorithm 5.6 (Heterogeneous fund algorithm). Choose an integer nmax ≥ 1.
Define n′t = nt by
n′t =
{
nt nt ≤ nmax
∞ otherwise.
Compute the consumption and investment strategy as follows:
(i) Keep accounts of the current funds associated with each individual.
(ii) At time t, for each surviving individual i in the fund invest and consume
according to the optimal strategy for a homogeneous fund of n′t investors
identical to that individual with budget given by their current funds. Even
if, after consumption, the individual dies at time t, one should pursue the
same investment strategy as one would have done if they had survived.
Compute the resulting wealth X˚it+δt of each individual i who was alive at
time t.
36
(iii) For an investor i who survives to time t+δt we define their “contribution”
to the collective at time t+ δt, Γit+δt by
Γit+δt = (1− sit)X˚it+δt.
This can be interpreted as a fair price for the derivative contract with a
payoff equal to the wealth received by the collective if the individual dies
and zero otherwise, so long as the pricing measure for the individual’s
mortality is taken to equal the physical measure P.
(iv) When an individual dies, divide their funds among the survivors in pro-
portion to each survivor’s contribution Γit+δt.
The purpose of the cut-off nmax in this algorithm is simply that it is com-
putationally expensive to compute the optimal strategy for a collective of n
investors if n is large.
The logic behind this algorithm is that we assume we can divide our popu-
lation into large groups of similar individuals. Let one such group of individuals
be of a type similar to ζ. Since the individuals are similar we assume that the
optimal strategies for each member of the group will be similar. Since the num-
ber of individuals in the group is large, the optimal strategy for nt individuals
of a given type will be similar to the optimal strategy for ∞ individuals of a
given type. The number of survivors will also be close to the expected value.
Thus (ii) and (iii) together will ensure that the value achieved by individuals of
type ζ will be close to v(∞, ζ).
We note that this argument is essentially a compactness and continuity ar-
gument. One could therefore write out a formal topological proof under suitable
assumptions. However, we do not believe doing so would be particularly illumi-
nating.
We note that the strategy arising form our algorithm is not itself an accept-
able strategy according to our formal definition. However, we expect it should
still perform well in practice. In Section 6.4 we test this algorithm numerically.
We find that it gives good results for our test example.
6 Numerical Results
6.1 A comparison of annuities, individual (DC) funds and
collective (CDC) funds
We wish to compare numerically the performance of annuities, individual funds
and collective funds. To do this we must now choose precise market, mortality
and preference models. We choose market and mortality models which are as
close as possible to the model used in Pension Policy Institute (2018), which
in turn is based on modelling assumptions of Office of Budget Responsibility
(OBR) (2019). The full specification of our model is given in Section 6.1.1.
The numerical results are then presented in Section 6.1.2.
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6.1.1 Model specification
We will work in continuous time for investments, but consumption will be as-
sumed to take place in discrete time, with δt taken to be 1 year.
We specialise to the case of the Black–Scholes–Merton model. That is, we
suppose that the risky asset S2t follows geometric Brownian motion with drift µ
and volatility σ
dS2t = S
2
t (dµt + σ dWt), S
2
0 . (6.1)
We emphasize that all values are quoted in real terms. In particular r is the
difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation. Similarly
µ measures real returns.
There are many well-known limitations to the Black–Scholes–Merton model.
We believe that the most important limitation of the model for pension mod-
elling is the assumption of a fixed deterministic interest rate. For example,
the low interest rates that have prevailed over the last decade have had a dra-
matic impact upon pension outcomes. Nevertheless for the purposes of this
paper (developing a framework for preferences with mortality and estimating
the potential benefits of collectivised pensions) we believe that this limitation is
acceptable. We aim to extend our approach to stochastic interest rate models
in future research.
Currently in the UK, the state pension grows in real terms due to the so-
called “triple lock”. The UK Office of Budget Responsibility uses a deterministic
model of the state pension growing at a rate of average earnings growth plus
0.36%, yielding a net growth rate of 4.7%.
We are able to incorporate this into our preference model by choosing a gain
function of the form
J (γ, τ) = E (− exp (−sγ,τ )) (6.2)
where the satisfaction, sγ,τ is given by
sγ,τ =
∫ τ
0
u(γt, t) dT (t)
and where u is given by
u(γ, t) =
{
a(γt + SPt)
ρ − a(ALt + SPt)ρ γt ≥ 0 ∀t,
−∞ otherwise. (6.3)
The parameter SPt is a deterministic state pension at time t, and ALt is the
adequacy level for the private pension. Thus if the individual consumes at a
rate γt = ALt at all times, their overall satisfaction will be 0. The parameter
ρ < 1 is a satiation parameter and a is a satisfaction-risk-aversion parameter.
If ρ < 0, a < 0 otherwise a > 0. Our gain function ensures that consumption
must always be non-negative.
We note that incorporating the state pension into the model will inevitably
break any homogeneity properties of the problem and, if the state pension is
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time varying, this will also break any translation invariance properties. This is
why we have selected to use a time varying-version of exponential Kihlstrom–
Mirman preferences in this model.
The numerical value of the parameter a in our gain function will depend
upon the units of currency. To remedy this we first define XAL to be the
currency value required at time 0 in order to fund a deterministic pension of
ALt := max{ALt, 0}
XAL =
∫ τ
0
e−rtALt dT (t).
We now define a parameter λ by
λ = lim
→0
s(1+)ALt,t − sALt,t

.
The parameter λ therefore measures the rate of increase in satisfaction as one
proportionately increases a deterministic pension set at the adequacy level. It
provides a dimensionless parameter proportional to a.
We must choose all the parameters in our model in order to perform the
comparison.
Table 2 contains a summary of all our parameter assumptions.
The market parameters are mostly calibrated using the assumptions of Of-
fice of Budget Responsibility (OBR) (2019). For equity returns we used the
assumptions of the report Pension Policy Institute (2018) which were designed
to be compatible with those of the OBR. To estimate equity volatility, σ, we
used data for the FTSE All Share Total Return Index from December 1985 to
June 2019 obtained from (Bloomberg L.P., 2019).
The mortality distribution pt was obtained using the model CMI 2018 de-
scribed in (Mortality Projections Committee, 2019). We used this model to find
the mortality distribution for women of UK retirement aged 65 in 2019 (65 being
the UK retirement age as of 2019). The CMI model requires one to choose a
parameter determining the long-term rate of mortality improvement. We chose
a long-term rate of 1.5%, the same value used in the illustrative examples of
Mortality Projections Committee (2019). To avoid numerical problems caused
by low probability events, the age distribution was cut off at the point where the
probability of surviving to this age was only 10−5. The resulting distribution is
shown in Figure 1.
The parameters determining the utility function are subjective and will vary
from individual to individual, as will the available budget. Thus we can only
choose illustrative values for these parameters. We will now briefly explain how
the values for these parameters were selected.
(i) Choice of ρ. We know that in the case of von-Neumann Morgernstern
preferences with utility function u(x), the value of ρ is closely related to
the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. Since von-Neumann Morg-
ernstern preferences are a limiting case of exponential preferences, this
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Figure 1: Probability density pt for the random variable τ . Data for UK women
aged 65 in 2019 using the model CMI 2018 F [1.5%] (see Mortality Projections
Committee (2019)).
suggests we calibrate ρ from empirically observed inter-temporal substitu-
tion. The mean elasticity observed in the meta-analysis Havranek et al.
(2015) is 0.5. We compute the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in
the case of homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences in Armstrong and Buescu
(2019b). Together these results suggests we choose ρ such that 11−ρ = 0.5,
hence we take ρ = −1. We emphasize that the value of ρ will likely vary
between individuals.
(ii) Choice of X0. We choose the initial budget X0 to equal XAL. Thus
our illustrative individual can just afford a deterministic pension at the
adequacy level.
(iii) Choice of ALt. We are referring to the parameter ALt as the adequacy
level because it is the obvious generalization of the notion of adequacy
level given in Section 1.2 to the form of gain function we are using in
this section. However, the term “adequacy” has already been used in the
pension literature and we will insert quotation marks around the word
“adequacy” when the term should be understood in this broad sense.
Various definitions for “adequacy” have been proposed. For example, one
may choose an “adequacy” level based on absolute poverty worldwide, rela-
tive poverty within one’s country or relative to one’s own lifetime earnings.
See Redwood et al. (2013) for a fuller discussion. There is no a priori rea-
son why our formal notion of adequacy should correspond to any particular
notion of “adequacy”. Indeed most notions of “adequacy” depend only on
the age, nationality and income of the individual whereas our notion of
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adequacy depends on preferences and so is likely to vary between individ-
uals of identical age, income and nationality. Nevertheless, we will choose
one specific model of “adequacy” to determine AL: specifically we will
use the target replacement rates given in Pensions Commission (2004) to
determine the “adequacy” level as a proportion of final earnings.
The usual notion of “adequacy” refers to the required total pension. Since
we have modelled the state pension by making a horizontal shift of our
utility function, our notion of adequacy is correspondingly reduced by the
state pension.
With this understood, we assume that our individual is earning £24, 100
per annum, which is the median income before tax for individuals age 60–
64 in 2016–17 in the UK (HM Revenue & Customs, 2019). Then following
the Pension Commission’s suggested target replacement rates (Pensions
Commission (2004), updated to 2017 terms) we choose a target replace-
ment rate of 70%. This gives an “adequacy” level of £16, 800 per annum
for the total income from private and state pension.
(iv) Choice of λ. We take λ = 1 as an illustrative example. To decide on a
reasonable value for λ, one can look at the resulting range in the level of
consumption when one simulates the investment strategy. We will plot a
fan-diagram of the consumption in the next section (Figure 2) and it can
be seen from this diagram that λ = 1 gives a reasonable result. In practice
one might try to calibrate λ for an individual using a risk questionnaire,
but we will not attempt to consider how such a questionnaire could be
designed.
6.1.2 Numerical Comparison
Using the model with parameters as described in Section 6.1.1 we are able to
compute the optimal consumption for an individual fund (n = 1), a collective
fund (n = ∞) and to compare this with an annuity. The numerical method
required to do this is described in the paper Armstrong and Buescu (2019a).
The resulting pattern of consumption is shown in Figure 2.
The line illustrating the consumption of an annuity is straightforward to
understand. It is a horizontal line as the consumption from an annuity is con-
stant until death. Similarly the line representing pension adequacy is simple
to understand. It starts at the current adequacy level but decreases over time
deterministically due to the assumed increase in the state pension.
The optimal consumption of the individual fund, however, is not determin-
istic. To illustrate this consumption we have plotted a fan diagram. This fan
diagram is made up of the four different lines in the figure all drawn with a
continuous line style (and coloured red in colour reproductions). Three of these
lines represent the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of the consumption at each
point in time: these three lines are nearly smooth. The jagged line represents
one illustrative random scenario.
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Param-
eter
Value Description Justification
SPt £6718 exp(rTLt) Annual state
pension.
£129.20 per week
as of July 2019.
Growth as in OBR
2019.
ALt £16800− SPt. Adequacy level. Pensions
Commission (2004)
and (HM Revenue
& Customs, 2019)
rCPI 0.02 CPI growth. OBR 2019.
r 0.047− rCPI Gilt returns. OBR 2019.
rTL 0.47− rCPI State pension
growth.
OBR 2019.
µ 0.082− rCPI Equity growth. Based on 4.6%
index growth as in
OBR 2019 together
with a dividend
yield of 3.6% as
assumed in Pension
Policy Institute
(2018).
σ 0.15 Bloomberg L.P.
(2019)
X0 XAL = £126636 Initial fund value.
ρ −1 Satiation
parameter.
Havranek et al.
(2015).
λ 1 Satisfaction-risk-
aversion
parameter.
Illustrative choice.
pt CMI 2018 F [1.5%] Mortality
distribution
CMI 2018
Table 2: Parameter summary
The optimal consumption for the collective fund is given by a similar fan
diagram. The same stock price path was used to generate the illustrative random
scenario for the collective and individual cases.
Since the gain of an individual depends on both consumption and mortality,
one should cross-reference the diagram of consumption with Figure 1 which
shows the corresponding mortality distribution.
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Figure 2: Fan diagram of optimal consumption over time for different types of
pension fund. The percentiles shown in the fan are at (5%, 50%, 95%).
The diagram was obtained by computing a numerical approximation to the
optimal investment strategies using the method Armstrong and Buescu (2019a).
The percentiles were then estimated by performing 105 independent stock price
simulations, applying the strategy and then computing the sample percentiles.
In Table 3 we present the annuity equivalent value of each investment-
consumption approach. We define this to be the price of an annuity which
would give the same gain. This is a monetary measure of how much a strat-
egy outperforms an annuity (or underperforms). We also present the annuity
outperformance. This is the defined by
annuity outperformance :=
annuity equivalent
budget
− 1.
This gives a measure of the performance of the strategy relative to an annuity
of the same cost.
Our conclusion is that, for this illustrative example, collectivised pension
investment substantially outperforms an annuity. Although in this particular
example, an individual fund outperforms an annuity, a change to the param-
eters (for example taking µ = 0.75) may yield a situation where the annuity
outperforms the individual fund. By contrast the optimum collective pension
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Fund Annuity Equivalent (£× 103) Annuity Outperformance
Annuity 126.6 0%
Individual 128.7 + 1.5%
Collective 152.2 + 20%
Table 3: Numerical comparison of the three investment-consumption strategies
with parameters as given in Section 6.1.1
investment is guaranteed to outperform an annuity.
6.2 The impact of satiation-risk-aversion and the adequacy
level
To understand how satiation-risk-aversion affects the optimal investment strat-
egy in the collectivised case, it is instructive to set the parameter λ to a high
value and to increase the initial budget. Figure 3 illustrates the optimal con-
sumption pattern if we set λ = 50 and X0 = 2XAL, but otherwise use the same
parameters as described in Section 6.1.1.
We see that the initial consumption is very high, but then reduces to closely
track the adequacy level. To interpret this result, note that the only way it is
possible to achieve a deterministic satisfaction is to: start with a budget of at
least the AL; consume at the adequacy level at all times t > 0; consume at the
adequacy level plus any excess budget at time t = 0. Given that this is the
only strategy that yields deterministic satisfaction, it is now unsurprising that
if the satisfaction-risk-aversion is set to a high value, the resulting consumption
strategy will closely approximate this deterministic strategy.
If the initial budget is lower than XAL but the risk-aversion is still high, we
found in numerical examples that the behaviour was to consume at a low level
until there is sufficient budget to begin tracking the adequacy level.
This behaviour is consistent with that found analytically for homogeneous
Epstein–Zin utility in Armstrong and Buescu (2019b). The behaviour in this
case is exaggerated because the adequacy level is forced to be either 0 or ∞ in
order to achieve homogeneous preferences.
We remark that in Armstrong and Buescu (2019b) the analytic formulae
for the change in consumption over time are interpreted in terms of the “com-
pensation” one receives if one lives a long time at below the adequacy level.
This interpretation was couched in the language of “compensation” and hence
“fairness”. By contrast in this section our interpretation of the same phenom-
ena has been given in the language of risk. We note that our use of Rawls’
Veil of Ignorance to operationalize fairness explains the equivalence of these
interpretations.
Our conclusion is that the adequacy level does indeed play an important role
in pension investment. We note that a satisfaction-risk-averse individual may
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Figure 3: Fan diagram of the optimal consumption for an infinite collective
for high satisfaction-risk-aversion λ. The percentiles shown in the fan are at
(5%, 50%, 95%).
well decide to spend a large part of their pension fund shortly after retirement
due to the unhedgeable risk that they may die young. We note that investing in
an annuity suggests an inconsistent attitude towards risk: one is being entirely
risk-averse in investment decisions, yet one is ignoring the risk of dying young.
This may help explain why many pension investors instinctively find annuities
unattractive.
6.3 Comparison between Exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman
and Epstein–Zin preferences
To compare the results we have seen with exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman pref-
erences with those obtained under Epstein–Zin preferences, we plot in Figure
4 the optimal consumption calculated using homogeneous Epstein–Zin prefer-
ences, but with all market parameters as before. The state pension and the
adequacy level ALt are no longer used in the calculation. Instead, the adequacy
level will be determined by the coefficients α and ρ themselves and will always
take a value of ∞ or 0. The analytic results of Armstrong and Buescu (2019b)
were used to plot this diagram.
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Figure 4: Fan diagram of optimal consumption for an infinite collective (n =∞)
with Epstein–Zin preferences. We illustrate both the case of von Neumannn–
Morgernstern preferences (α = ρ) and of satiation-risk-aversion (α < ρ). The
percentiles in the fans are (5%, 50%, 95%).
The marked qualitative difference between the plot for exponential prefer-
ences and for homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences can be explained by the
tendency to track the adequacy level as satiation-risk-aversion increase. The
median consumption gradually decreases in very old age for the collective fund
with exponential preferences in Figure 2 because the adequacy level in this case
is zero. The median consumption increases in very old age for the collective fund
with homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences in Figure 4 because the adequacy
level in this case is ∞.
We believe this emphasizes that considering the adequacy level and state
pension is important in determining the optimal investment strategy.
One can incorporate the state pension and adequacy level into Epstein–Zin
preferences if one is willing to sacrifice homogeneity and to choose a value for the
parameter β required for inhomogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences. We believe
that the numerical method of Armstrong and Buescu (2019a) could be adapted
to solve the problem in this case.
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Figure 5: Histogram of the optimality ratio, ORi, obtained using Algorithm 5.6
for a randomly generated fund of 100 investors.
6.4 A Heterogeneous Fund
To test Algorithm 5.6 we generated a random fund of n = 100 individuals. Each
individual had von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences given by a power utility
with the power uniformly generated in the range [−1.5,−0.5]. The initial wealth
of each individual was taken to be uniformly distributed in the range [0.5, 1.5].
The retirement age of each individual was taken to be a uniformly distributed
random integer in the range 60–69. The sex of the individual was chosen as male
with probability 50%. All of these random choices were made independently.
The mortality distribution for each individual was then computed using the
CMI model with longterm rate 1.5% and retirement year of 2019.
Using this population, we ran 106 simulations of the investment and con-
sumption strategy given in Algorithm 5.6 using the value nmax = 50. This
allowed us to compute a sample average utility, uiS , for each individual i.
We define uin to be the expected utility that would be achieved by individual
i if they were to invest in a homogeneous collective of n individuals. We define
the optimality ratio for individual i by
ORi :=
uiS − ui1
ui∞ − ui1
.
If this ratio is close to 1, then the utility experienced by individual i is close to
the optimum value they can expect from any acceptable collectivised investment.
We plot a histogram of the optimality ratio, ORi, for each of our 100 fund
members in Figure 5. In our example, the optimality ratio is almost always
above 98%. This demonstrates that, even with as few as 100 investors, our
investment strategy is close to optimal.
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